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This article discusses the growing trend to employ private parties as informants, pri-
vate detectives and providers of digital technology (e.g., automated risk assessments) 
to predict and investigate welfare fraud. In this article, we argue that this type of out-
sourcing is problematic for multiple reasons. First, private actors and governments of-
ten have an ill-defined contractual relationship which creates legal uncertainty and 
promotes the use of unconventional evidence-gathering instruments. This issue also 
raises concerns regarding the accountability of public bodies and the transparency 
and fairness of administrative procedure. Second, the private enforcement of anti-
fraud regulations is susceptible of endangering the adequate pursuit of the public in-
terest due to the misalignment of public and private interests. Third, the outsourcing 
of enforcement tasks to private technology companies and their opaque automated 
systems can be detrimental to the right to due process, the right to non-discrimination, 
and the privacy of welfare recipients. This article contributes to the literature with a 
novel critical account of how private actors are reshaping the welfare state.
* I would like to thank Catalina Goanta, Valery Gantchev, Mariolina Eliantonio as well as the 
anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.
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1 Introduction
In October 2019, the newspaper The Guardian dedicated a full week to the “au-
tomation of poverty,” describing governmental practices throughout the world 
that involve employing technology to watch closely welfare recipients.1 The 
use of digital technology and other surveillance techniques to prevent welfare 
fraud had been criticized months earlier by the UN Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty and Human rights as well as in recent literature on data-driven social 
security.2 The development of a digital risk assessment system (‘SyRi’) for wel-
fare fraud prevention is also at the time of writing the subject of a judicial case 
in the Netherlands.3 This system helps predict which welfare recipients are 
more likely to abuse the system and should thus be investigated.4 Despite the 
alleged discriminatory character of SyRi, this system has been developed by 
Dutch public authorities and benefits from a relatively clear public legal frame-
work. However, the same is not true for many other digital and analog tech-
niques employed by private actors in welfare fraud investigations which are 
1 E. Pilkington, 2019. ‘Automating Poverty’. The Guardian, 14 October. Retrieved 31 December 
2019, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/series/automating-poverty.
2 UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Annual Report 2019. Re-
trieved 31 December 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Poverty/Pages/AnnualReports 
.aspx. See also Human Rights Watch, May 2019 Submission to theUNSpecial Rapporteur on 
Extreme Poverty & Human Rights Regarding His Thematic Report on Digital Technology, Social 
Protection & Human Rights. Retrieved 29 July 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/pages/home 
.aspx. V. Gantchev, ‘Data protection in the age of welfare conditionality: Respect for basic 
rights or a race to the bottom?’, European Journal of Social Security 21(1) (2019) (Gantchev) 
3–22. https://doi.org/10.1177/1388262719838109.
3 The case is pending before the Court of first instance of The Hague. A decision is expected 
early 2019. For updated information on this case, see www.rechtspraak.nl.
4 Although this system has not yet succeeded at identifying well-founded cases of fraud, SyRi 
is perceived as a discriminatory tool to stigmatize welfare recipients, particularly non- 
Western minorities. For an analysis of the information that is collected in this type of con-
texts and their societal impact, see S. Headworth, ‘Getting to Know You: Welfare Fraud Inves-
tigation and the Appropriation of Social Ties’, American Sociological Review 87 (2019) 
(Headworth) 171–196.
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often regulated through blurry contractual constructions.5 In this article we 
analyze the legal problems of outsourcing public law enforcement to private 
actors, particularly in the context of welfare fraud. This article delves into three 
common ways of involving private actors in welfare fraud prediction and de-
tection: (i) as informants who tip-off public authorities on individuals who 
may be committing fraud; (ii) as private detectives who gather evidence on 
fraud; and (iii) as providers of automated systems that analyze data on citizens 
and predict the occurrence of fraud.6
Our focus includes welfare fraud investigations in the context of housing 
allowances for single-parents and students, unemployment benefits, and other 
benefits for illness and disability. Although this article is not strictly compara-
tive, it seeks to show the growing relevance of the outsourcing of enforcement 
tasks to private parties with examples from the United Kingdom, Switzerland, 
United States, and the Netherlands.7 In these four jurisdictions welfare systems 
are liberal or have recently acquired traits of neoliberalism with the growing 
pressure to privatize certain parts of the system due to budget constraints.8 As 
this article shows, the use of these privatization methods has been welcomed 
differently in these countries.9 While in the Netherlands, the employment of 
private detectives has been harshly criticized in case law, in Switzerland, wel-
fare legislation was recently amended to provide an explicit legislative frame-
work to allow private detectives hired by social insurance bodies to monitor 
5 Several data science companies offer data-analytics services for public bodies. Examples are 
Totta Data Lab or Ynformed. For literature on the privatization of social welfare, see, for in-
stance, R. Forest and A. Murie, Selling the Welfare State: The Privatisation of Public Housing 
(London: Routledge, 1988); K.L. Moore, ‘Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform’, 
Temple Law Review 71(1) (1998) 129–170; M. Abramovitz, ‘The Privatization of the Welfare 
State: A Review’, Social Works 31(4) (1986) 257–264; B. Romzek and J.M. Johnston, ‘State social 
services contracting: Exploring the determinants of effective contract accountability’, Public 
Administration Review 65(4) (2005) 436–449.
6 See J. Reeves, Citizen Spies: The Long Rise of America’s Surveillance Society (New York: New 
York University Press, 2017) (Reeves).
7 See, for instance, K. Gustafson, Cheating on Welfare: Public Assistance and the Criminalization 
of Poverty (New York: New York University Press, 2011) (Gustafson); M. B. Katz, The Undeserv-
ing Poor: America’s Enduring Confrontation with Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013). The trend to rely on private actors is also visible in several other countries: See, for in-
stance, C. Aulich and J. O’ Flynn, ‘From Public to Private: The Australian Experience of Priva-
tization’, Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration 29(2) (2007) 153–171.
8 J. B. Williamson, ‘Privatization of Social Security in the United Kingdom: Warning or Exem-
plar?’, Journal of Aging Studies 16(4) (2002) 415–430; R. B. DuBoff, ‘The Welfare State, Pensions, 
Privatization: The Case of Social Security in the United States’, International Journal of Health 
Studies 27(1) (1997) 1–23.
9 See also C. Donnelly, ‘Privatization and Welfare: A Comparative Perspective’, Law & Ethics of 
Human Rights 5(2) (2011) (Donnelly) 1938–2545.
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welfare recipients anywhere in the public space.10 It is worth noting that in 
Switzerland there is already a strong collaboration between public and private 
institutions in the social security system (through private insurances).11 De-
spite the differences between these countries, in all of them (including Swit-
zerland) the changing role of the Welfare State and the interaction between 
public and private parties therein are under discussion.12
This article offers primarily a critical reflection on privatization and how 
new forms of involving private actors in public law enforcement are reshaping 
the complex relationship between the State, society, and the market.13 This ar-
ticle does not aim to delve into automated decision-making and its technologi-
cal intricacies or offer strict comparisons between social security systems 
which always involve a socio-political analysis.14 Rather, we address the larger 
problem posed by all three different types of involvement of private parties in 
the enforcement of social welfare laws: the illegitimate transfer of important 
public functions to private parties.15
This article engages with different strands of the international legal litera-
ture on privatization and outsourcing, the criminalization of social security 
10 This legislative amendment occurred in response to the ruling of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the case Vukota-Bojić v. Switzerland, no. 61838/10, see Part ii, echr 2016. 
The mentioned amendment was subject to a national referendum in November 2018, 
in  which two-thirds of the population voted in favor of this enhanced form of fraud 
prevention.
11 M. Leimgruber, Solidarity without the State? Business and the Shaping of the Swiss Welfare 
State, 1890–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). C. F. Bertozzi and F. Gi-
lardi, ‘The Swiss Welfare State a Changing Public-Private Mix?’ in D. Belard and B. Gran 
(eds), Public and Private Social Policy: Health and Pension Policies in a NewEU (Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 207–227.
12 S. Rossini, ‘Gouvernance de la sécurité sociale suisse. La politique sociale prise au piège de 
la pensé comptable’, in: C. Bolzman, J. Libois and F. Tschopp (eds), Le travail social à la 
recherché de nouveaux paradigms (Geneva: ies éditions, 2017), 87–103.
13 M. Leimgruber, ‘Etat féderal, Etat social? L’ histographie de la protection sociale en Suisse’, 
Zeitschrift für Geschichte 18 (2011), 217–231.
14 See, for a thorough overview of the use of automated systems and big data in the preven-
tion of welfare fraud, V. Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Po-
lice, and Punish the Poor (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2018) (Eubanks). The reliance on 
automated systems is part of a broader trend in highly digitalized countries (e.g., Den-
mark): See C.S. Byrne and J. Sommer, 2019. ‘Is the Scandinavian Digitalisation Breeding 
Ground for Social Welfare Surveillance?’. DataEthics, May 27. Retrieved 1 July 2019, https://
dataethics.eu/is-scandinavian-digitalisation-breeding-ground-for-social-welfare- 
surveillance/. On the challenges of comparing social security systems, see J. Dixon, ‘Com-
parative social security: The challenge of evaluation’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analy-
sis:  Research and Practice, 1:1 (1998), 61–95.
15 Given the growing importance of this topic, automated decision-making will be explored 
in future research.
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fraud, and the public-private divide.16 We contend that the binary lens of the 
public-private divide remains helpful but it does not foresee many of the po-
tential risks of a broader outsourcing of public tasks, particularly in the digital 
age.17 This article is organized as follows: the first part delves into the specific 
nature of social security as a right and describes the evolution of the privatiza-
tion trend in this sector. The second part focusses on the legal issues of em-
ploying private actors and their automated systems in the prevention and 
sanction of welfare fraud. The third part offers a normative framework for the 
privatization of public services. The fourth part concludes.
2 The Privatization of Social Welfare
2.1 Social Security as a Right
Social security systems were established in the twentieth century in multiple 
Western countries to address growing inequality and provide assistance to 
needy citizens. The right to social security is explicitly protected at interna-
tional level in the European Social Charter, the UN Convention on Economic 
and Social Rights, the European Code of Social Security, the International La-
bor Organization (ilo) Convention No. 102. In the last decades we have ob-
served the Europeanization of the right to social security as a result of the case 
law of the European Court of Justice of the European Union, the European 
Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’), and the decisions of the European Commit-
tee of Social Rights.18
16 See, on privatization, providing an overview of the legal challenges of privatization in dif-
ferent fields, J. Freeman, ‘Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative 
Law’, Administrative Law Review 52(3) (2000) 813–858 (Freeman); M.J. Trebilcock and E.M. 
Iacobucci, ‘Privatization and Accountability’, Harvard Law Review 116(5) (2002) 1422–1453; 
J. Freeman and M. Minow (eds), Government by Contract: Outsourcing and American De-
mocracy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009). See also F. O’Carroll, ‘Inher-
ently Governmental: A Legal Argument for Ending Private Federal Prisons and Detention 
Centers’, Emory Law Journal 67(2) (2017) 293–335 (O’Carroll).
17 S.M. Ford, ‘Reconceptualizing the Public/private Distinction in the Age of Information 
Technology’, Information, Communication & Society 14(4) (2011) 550–567. See, generally, 
on the public/private divide, M. Lombard, ‘La régulation et la distinction du droit public 
et du droit privé en droit français’, in: M. Freedland and J-B. Auby (eds.), The Public Law/
Private Law Divide: Une Entente Assez Cordiale? (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Pub-
lishing, 2006) 81–89 at 83; S. Palmer, ‘Public Functions and Private Services: A Gap in the 
Human Rights Protection’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 6(3) (2008) 
585–604.
18 G. Katrougalos, ‘Social Security in the ‘case law’ of the Social Rights Committee’, in: 
F.   Pennings and G. Vonk (eds), Research Handbook on European Social Security Law 
 (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar, 2015) 84–102.
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Social security is nowadays guided by two main principles both at the na-
tional and international levels: solidarity and equal treatment.19 These princi-
ples require inter-generational support, a fair distribution of income, social 
assistance for individuals who cannot earn an income, and prohibit discrimi-
nation.20 The main goal of social security and other social allowances is to al-
leviate poverty, support specific disfavored groups that might not be able to 
earn additional income (single parents) and invest in education (student 
allowances).21 This transfer of income is meant to promote individual freedom 
and distributive justice.22 The notion of social citizenship proposed by Mar-
shall underlies still nowadays the concept of social welfare benefits and it re-
quires that individuals are provided access to the necessary social and eco-
nomic resources to participate in society.23 As McKeever explains, this implies 
not only having access to financial assistance but also being given the “freedom 
to make choices with knowledge of their consequences.”24 For many, this state 
of freedom means transitioning back to the labor market, for others it simply 
means enjoying a minimum level of social and cultural participation.
2.2 Social Welfare Fraud
With the growing rise in social security expenditure, states have felt compelled 
not only to reduce the dependency of recipients on welfare services but also to 
control more rigorously their eligibility.25 Social security fraud varies from 
 minor distortions of the truth by individual claimants on their eligibility to 
19 P-Y. Greber, ‘La sécurité sociale: une histoire, une culture, des défis: approche de droit in-
ternational’, Cahiers Genevois et Romands de la Sécurité Sociale 44 (2012) 9–28 at 21.
20 G. Vonck and M. Olivier, ‘The Fundamental Right of Social Assistance: A Global, a  Regional 
(Europe and Africa) and a National Perspective (Germany, The Netherlands, and South 
Africa)’, European Journal of Social Security 21(3) (2019) 219–240.
21 G. McKeever, ‘Social Citizenship and Social Security Fraud in the UK and Australia’, Social 
Policy & Administration 46(4) (2012) 465–482 (McKeever) at 470.
22 E. Eichenhofer, ‘Social Security as a Human Right: A European Perspective’, in: F. Pennings 
and G. Vonk (eds), Research Handbook on European Social Security Law (Cheltenham, UK 
and Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar, 2015) 3–32.
23 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press, 1950) 7–10.
24 McKeever (n 21) 467.
25 According to a 2016 oecd report, public social spending amounted on average to 21% of 
the gdp of oecd countries: See oecd, 2018. ‘Social Expenditure Database (socx) Up-
date’. Retrieved 18 December 2018, http://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm. See, for 
an overview of the costs of fraud prevention in different jurisdictions: C. van Stolk and 
E.D. Tesliuc, 2010. ‘Toolkit on Tackling Error, Fraud, and Corruption in Social Protection 
Programs’. World Bank. Retrieved 19 December 2019, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Safety-Nets-DP/1002.pdf.
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welfare (e.g., submitting false documents for inexistent children, failure to re-
port all of the earnings) to organized and sophisticated offences.26
In the United Kingdom, the United States, Switzerland, and in the Nether-
lands preventing and sanctioning social security fraud has been a priority for a 
number of years as fraudulent claims are estimated to amount to millions (if 
not billions) of dollars every year.27 Nevertheless, caseworkers are often too 
understaffed to investigate all recipients.28 Therefore, the success of social wel-
fare fraud detection depends on obtaining high quality information about the 
lives of those who may be abusing the system.29 It is in this context that in the 
last decade multiple countries have urged citizens to come forward with tips 
on fraud and made significant investments in the creation of new task forces to 
combat fraud. Anti-fraud policies appear to be well-received by voters as they 
respond to the widespread public perception that social welfare recipients can 
play the system to their advantage and should thus be heavily penalized for 
doing so.30 Well-publicized scandals in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s have 
contributed to the negative public image of welfare benefits and fraud mostly 
committed by women.31 From a broader perspective, it is worth noting that 
anti-fraud policies are also perceived as important as fraud undermines the 
basis of solidarity which is absolutely essential for the existence of a social se-
curity system.
In the Netherlands, the political pressure to combat welfare fraud has also 
increased significantly in the last decade.32 This has been fueled by multiple 
26 McKeever (n 21) 466.
27 Ibid. at 141.
28 M. Button, ‘Fraud Investigations and the ‘Flawed Architecture’ of Counter Fraud Entities 
in the United Kingdom’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 39(4) (2011) (But-
ton) 249–265.
29 Headworth (n 4) 172.
30 See M.R. Rank, ‘A View from the Inside Out: Recipients’ Perception of Welfare’, Journal of 
Sociology and Social Welfare 21(2) (1994) 27–47.
31 See, for a historical overview, M. Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Wel-
fare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present (Boston: South End Press, 1988); A. Pember-
ton, ‘Discipline and Pacification in the Modern Administrative State: The Case of Social 
Welfare’, Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 17(2) (1990) 125–142. See also D.E. Chunn and 
S.A.M. Gavigan, ‘Welfare Law, Welfare Fraud, and the Moral Regulation of the ‘Never De-
serving’ Poor’, Social and Legal Studies 13(2) (2004) (Chunn and Gavigan) 219–243, 220; B. 
Baumberg Geiger, ‘The role of knowledge and ‘myths’ in the perceived deservingness of 
social security benefit claimants’, in: F. Roosma, B. Meuleman, and W. van Oorschot (eds), 
The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare: Attitudes of Welfare Deservingness (Cheltenham, 
UK and Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar, 2017) 73–92.
32 The Dutch legislator has, for example, required local governments to impose important 
financial sanctions on welfare recipients in any case of fraud (including minor violations 
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recent fraud incidents involving individuals with an immigration background. 
In 2018 journalists reported on large-scale fraud of Eastern European individu-
als who applied for Dutch unemployment benefits, while taking long holiday 
breaks in their home countries.33 An investigation unveiling that a large num-
ber of welfare recipients were concealing real estate in Turkey also made the 
press headlines.34 Since 2015 the Dutch Court of Appeals has concluded in nu-
merous cases involving Turkish nationals receiving welfare benefits but alleg-
edly living abroad, that municipalities violated the prohibition to discriminate 
on the grounds of nationality.35 In May 2019, Dutch media reported that the 
Dutch Tax and Customs Administrations had tampered with evidence to can-
cel the child benefits of a significant number of parents with double national-
ity and a non-Western immigration background.36 Subsequent investigations 
confirmed that most of these parents were in fact eligible for the benefits 
they claimed, resulting in a public apology of the Minister of Finance for the 
seemingly discriminatory investigations, who admitted that “welfare fraud 
prevention was losing its human dimension.”37 Indeed, although there are na-
tional variations, the popular perception of welfare fraud tends to be much 
higher than the reality: only a very small minority of welfare recipients abuses 
of the duty to inform the authorities. In the Netherlands, local governments often are re-
sponsible for the administration of numerous social benefits, including the determina-
tion of eligibility and fraud prevention. Fraudulent welfare recipients are required to pay 
back the undeservedly received benefits and an additional fine which typically amounts 
to the same amount they received. In practice, fraudulent welfare recipients have to pay 
back the double amount. The Dutch Court of Appeals for Social Matters (Centrale Raad 
van Beroep, highest court in this case) considered that the statute dictating this outcome 
(Wet aanscherping handhaving en sanctiebeleid szw) was in breach of article 7 echr: See 
Centrale Raad van Beroep, November 24, 2014, ecli:NL:crvb:2014:3754.
33 ‘Widespread jobless benefit fraud in Polish community, Nieuwsuur says’. DutchNews 
2018, September 4. Retrieved 15 July 2019, https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2018/09/
widespread-jobless-benefit-fraud-in-polish-community-nieuwsuur-says/.
34 ‘Amper onderzoek naar bijstandsfraude Turken’. Binnenlands Bestuur 2018, October 20. 
Retrieved 19 December 2019, https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/sociaal/nieuws/amper-
onderzoek-naar-bijstandsfraude-turken.9599607.lynkx.
35 See, for an overview of these cases and the criteria applied, Dutch Court of Appeals for 
Social Matters, ‘Wat is toegestaan bij onderzoek naar bijstandsfraude in het buitenland?’. 
De Rechtspraak. Retrieved 19 December 2019, https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie-
en-contact/Organisatie/Centrale-Raad-van-beroep/Nieuws/Paginas/Wat-is-toegestaan-
bij-onderzoek-naar-bijstandsfraude-in-het-buitenland.aspx.
36 ‘Belastingdienst zette kinderopvangtoeslag stop naar aanleiding van achterhaalde 
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the system (between 2 and 10% in the United States, United Kingdom, and 
the  Netherlands).38 Moreover, intrusive, rigid and unclear anti-fraud strate-
gies  tend to be counterproductive as they do not distinguish between a 
needy  citizen who unknowingly made an honest mistake and organized 
crime. This approach deteriorates the relationship between citizens and their 
governments.39
Welfare fraud is typically sanctioned with administrative sanctions such as 
the immediate cancelation of benefits along with other administrative penal-
ties (e.g., ineligibility for welfare support for a certain period, or, more rarely, 
permanent disqualification for life from welfare). In addition to these civil or 
restitution penalties, several countries (e.g., United States, the Netherlands) 
impose criminal penalties for welfare fraud, prosecuting the most serious 
forms of intentional and willful misrepresentation. The current “criminaliza-
tion of welfare fraud” also includes a number of enforcement practices such as 
rules on the burden of proof, enhancement of enforcement tasks and rein-
forcement of surveillance of welfare recipients by undercover enforcement of-
ficers.40 In the United States, federal welfare legislation further limits the eligi-
bility for aid for adults with drug felony convictions.41
In the next section, we delve into the employment of private actors in the 
context of fraud-prevention and enforcement.
38 See, for the United States: Department of Labor. ‘Improper payment data for the Unem-
ployment Insurance (UI) program derived from the Benefit Accuracy Measurement 
(bam) program for the 12-month period ending March 31, 2014 (2014)’. Retrieved 19 De-
cember 2019, http://www.dol.gov/dol/maps/Data.htm. For information on the United 
Kingdom: Department for Work and Pensions. ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2012–13’. The 
Stationery Office, London, 2013. Retrieved 19 December 2019, https://assets.publishing 
.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/264555/
dwp-annual-report-accounts-2012-2013.pdf. For the Netherlands: P. de Winter, Tussen de 
Regels: Een rechtssociologische studie naar handhaving in de sociale zekerheid[Between 
the Rules: A Socio-legal Study of Law Enforcement in Social Welfare] (Groningen: Boom-
juridisch, 2019) [in Dutch].
39 See, for an empirical study in the Netherlands, M. Hertogh, Slimme Handhaving [Smart 
Enforcement] (The Hague: Boom juridisch, 2018). According to this study, aggressive 
fraud-combat strategies are not as effective as it is commonly thought. This empirical 
study shows that most welfare recipients comply with their obligations. Welfare fraud 
prevention mechanisms are experienced as a form of ‘policing’ rather than positive 
coaching which help them live independently from welfare. The study also shows that 
there is no clear correlation between repressive enforcement and compliance).
40 Chunn and Gavigan (n 31) 220; Gustafson (n 7) 51–52.
41 Gustafson (n 7) 55.
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3 Social Welfare Spies
Public bodies and their civil servants are traditionally regarded as the primary 
agents of public law enforcement. However, the prosecution of fraud is com-
plex, fragmented, time consuming, and it requires having “eyes and ears” ev-
erywhere.42 Public actors have thus resorted to citizens and professional pri-
vate investigators in a wide variety of fields.43 Although private actors have 
received limited attention from legal academia, these private agents outnum-
ber their public sector counterparts.44
In the twentieth century, private investigators reemerged as private security 
companies started offering specialized services and expertise to airports (e.g., 
for terrorism prevention), large corporations, and shopping malls.45 Private in-
vestigators are currently hired by governments and individuals to gather and 
examine facts in order to reconstruct past events in an efficient and accurate 
way.46
Private investigators are broadly employed in the United States, United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Switzerland by corporations and insurance 
companies to investigate fraudulent disability and illness claims.47 These 
 actors have also been strategically used in the context of financial crime 
 investigations which are often carried out by global auditing firms.48 Private 
investigators tend to benefit from their previous experience as former police 
agents, intelligence officers or highly-skilled IT-specialists.49 Moreover, private 
42 M. Button, D. Shepherd and D. Blackbourn, “The Iceberg beneath the Sea’, Fraudsters and 
Their Punishment through Non-criminal Justice in the ‘Fraud Justice Network in England 
and Wales”, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 53 (2018) 56–66 at 57.
43 M. Gill and J. Hart, ‘Exploring Investigative Policing: A Study of Private Detectives in Brit-
ain’, British Journal of Criminology 37(4) (1997) 549–567.
44 M. Button and B. George, ‘Government regulation in the United Kingdom private security 
industry: The myth of non-regulation’, Security Journal 14(1) (2001) 55–66.
45 M. Button, ‘Assessing the Regulation of Private Security across Europe’, European Journal 
of Criminology 4(1) (2007) 109–128 at 109–111.
46 See P. Gottschalk, Understanding White-Collar Crime: A Convenience Perspective (Boca 
 Raton: crc Press, 2016).
47 See A. Stenström, ‘The Private Policing of Insurance Claims: Power, Profit and Private Jus-
tice’, British Journal of Criminology 58(2) (2018) 478–496, discussing, on the grounds of an 
empirical study, how private policing are used to protect the profit of insurance compa-
nies. See also M.K. Nalla and G.R. Newman, ‘Public versus private control: A Reassess-
ment’, Journal of Criminal Justice 19(6) (1991) 537–547.
48 P. Gottschalk, ‘Blame Game and Rotten Apples in Private Investigation Reports: The Case 
of Hadeland and Ringerike Broadband in Norway’, Journal of Investigative Psychology and 
Offender Profiling 13(2) (2016) 91–109.
49 House of Commons-Home Affairs Committee. ‘Private Investigators: Fourth Report of 
Session 2012–13’. House of Commons. Retrieved 27 December 2018, https://publications 
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investigators are cost-effective as they are only hired when required. In the 
United Kingdom, some police forces have experimented with procuring ser-
vices previously carried out by police officers in order to face government 
cuts.50
Private investigations in the context of fraud prevention tend to be goal-
oriented procedures which start out from the suspicion of fraud or misconduct 
and they are desirably based on a mandate defined by and with the client.51 
The work of private investigators is thus limited in scope and should ideally 
deliver independent, careful, and transparent work. These investigators report 
back to private corporations that, in case of administrative or criminal fraud, 
can suggest that public bodies initiate an investigation. In Switzerland and in 
the Netherlands, social insurance companies and public bodies that are re-
sponsible for welfare benefits, have relied on similar private policing mecha-
nisms to investigate social welfare fraud.52 Employing private detectives has 
multiple advantages: first, contracts between public bodies and private agents 
allow companies to work around existing policies and operate with greater 
unilateral policy discretion.53 Second, some of these private investigators oper-
ate on the grounds of performance-based contracts, that is, their remuneration 
is dependent on the ability to detect fraud.54 While some of these compa-
nies are licensed and subject to special legislation, the activity of several others 
remains fully unregulated and can only be sanctioned by applying general pri-
vate law dispositions.55
.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmhaff/100/100.pdf. According to this report, 65% 
of private investigators are former police officers.
50 House of Commons – Home Affairs Committee. ‘The Role of the Private Investiga-
tor’.  House of Commons. Retrieved 26 December 2018, https://publications.parliament 
.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmhaff/100/10005.htm#note13.
51 P. Gottschalk, ‘Limits to Private Internal Investigations of White-Collar Crime Suspicions: 
The Case of Scandinavian Bank Nordea in Tax Havens’, Cogent Social Sciences 2(1) (2006) 
1–14, 3.
52 See, for an international perspective, J. De Waard, ‘The Private Security Sector in Fifteen 
European Countries: Size, Rules and Legislation’, Security Journal 4(2) (1993) 58–73. See, 
for a thorough analysis of private security, M. Button, Private Policing (Cullompton: Willan 
Publishing, 2002).
53 J.D. Michaels, ‘Privatization’s Pretensions’, University of Chicago Law Review 77(2) (2010) 
717–780 (Michaels) at 719.
54 Dutch Administrative High Court, September 16, 2014, ecli:NL:crvb:2014:2947. See also 
First-instance Court of Rotterdam, 6.10.2015, ecli:NL:rbrot:2015:7050 http://uitspraken 
.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:7050&keyword=investiga 
[in Dutch].
55 Wet particuliere beveiligingsorganisaties en recherchebureaus [Statute on private security 
organizations and investigators], October 24, 1997, Stb. 1997, 500. These enterprises are 
often consultancy agencies, who share knowledge with, advise, and educate the public 
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The involvement of private detectives and the use of technology developed 
by private companies are not the typical forms of privatization and outsourc-
ing of public tasks that the literature has analyzed for the past decades. There-
fore, these new forms of outsourcing of public tasks raise novel questions as to 
the admissibility and the legitimacy of private actors.56 In this part, we de-
scribe the involvement of private actors in welfare fraud investigations and 
inquire into the reasons why relying on private actors and their high-end sur-
veillance techniques may be problematic from a legal perspective.
3.1 Private Actors as Informants
“If you see something, say something” is a well-known appeal to citizens to re-
port suspicions of terrorist threats, provide tips to police regarding fugitives, 
and report fraud.57 These authorities coopt citizens’ sight, speech, and social 
networks as in the context of social welfare fraud, valuable information tends 
to come from informants who are close to the recipients.58 Citizens are en-
dowed with unique intelligence gathering that can complement the state’s 
 enforcement powers, they have access to private information, and are likely to 
hear what welfare recipients would never disclose to a public authority.59 In 
the last years, public authorities have even relied on gamification applications 
to make citizen involvement in law enforcement more appealing.60
Citizens can be involved in different ways in the context of welfare fraud 
investigations: first, welfare authorities in multiple countries encourage citi-
zens to come forward voluntarily with information on abusive claims. In the 
United Kingdom, citizens can report their suspicions through the Department 
for Work and Pensions (dwp) Fraud and Error Service and use the National 
sector and also offer services in fraud investigations. Three major players on the Dutch 
market are SV Land, Langhenkel, and Bureau Buitenland.
56 See, generally, J. Freeman and M. Minow, ‘Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing De-
bates’, in: J. Freeman and M. Minow (eds), Government by Contract: Outsourcing and 
American Democracy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009) 1–20 at 8; E.S. 
Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government (Chatham: Chatham House, 1987) 112. 
See also, criticizing the new forms of privatization, J.D. Michaels, ‘Privatization’s Progeny’, 
Georgetown Law Journal 101(4) (2013) 1023–1088.
57 Reeves (n 6) 3.
58 Headworth (n 4) 171–174.
59 Reeves (n 6) 10–11.
60 The Dutch police in particular has released two applications that incentivize citizens to 
get involved in the detection of stolen cars with the application ‘Automon’ or solve cold 
cases with ‘Sherlock’. See J. Milaj and G.J. Ritsema van Eck, ‘Capturing Licence Plates: 
 Police-Citizen Interaction Apps from an EU Data Protection Perspective’, International 
Review of Law, Computers and Technology (2019) https://doi-org.proxy-ub.rug.nl/10.1080/1
3600869.2019.1600335.
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Benefit Fraud Hotline. Similar services exist in the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
and the United States and are widely used by citizens. The Swiss National Ac-
cident Insurance Fund (Suva), one of the pillars of the country’s social security 
system, alone receives per year around 1700 tips of potential fraud.61 In many 
cases, the tips provided refer to neighbors, (former) partners, family members, 
and close acquaintances. With the development of social media (e.g, Face-
book), citizens have also become “digilantes” as they use their online networks 
to report on members of their networks.62
Citizens can also be involved as informal informants in the context of inter-
views conducted by investigators.63 In several situations, citizens may not be 
aware that they are putting at stake the welfare benefits of their neighbors or 
acquaintances. It has been reported that investigators in the United States 
have at times used subterfuges to obtain the information they need to detect 
fraud or have adapted information to fit the context of their investigation.64 
While omitting information may encourage individuals to be more frank with 
public authorities, it generates legal uncertainty and raises questions as to the 
legality of the evidence gathered in the context of investigations.65
The appeal to the civic duty to report fraud has been a source of criticism 
for decades.66 First, a significant number of tip-offs are driven by malice and 
the wish to take personal revenge on welfare recipients. In addition to the 
 potential conflict of interests, there is also the risk of overenforcement and 
underenforcement.67 The clear misalignment of interests between public 
61 suva, ‘Lutte contre la fraude à l’assurance’. suva. Retrieved 19 December 2019, https://
www.suva.ch/fr-ch/la-suva/autoportrait/lutte-contre-la-fraude-a-l-assurance.
62 S. Lageson and S. Maruna, ‘Digital Degradation: Stigma Management in the Internet Age’, 
Punishment and Society 20(1) (2018) 113–133. “Digilantes” refers in other contexts to a grow-
ing Internet subculture that seeks extrajudicial punishment for cybercriminals: See D.N. 
Byrne, ‘419 Digilantes and the Frontier of Radical Justice Online’, Radical History Renew 117 
(2013) 70–82.
63 See J. Gilliom (n 14), describing the constant surveillance welfare recipients are subject to 
and the role of social control.
64 Headworth (n 4) 174, 184.
65 J.M. Burkoff, ‘Not So Private Searches and the Constitution’, Cornell Law Review 66(4) 
(1981) 627–672 (Burkoff).
66 See, generally, Reeves (n 6).
67 M.E. Gilles, ‘Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the 
Enforcement of Civil Rights’, Columbia Law Review 100(6) (2000) 1384–1453. See, on under-
enforcement, B.H. Thompson Jr., ‘The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement’, 
University of Illinois Law Review (2000(1)) 185–236 at 204–06. See also D. Bowen Matthew, 
‘The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of Phar-
maceutical Fraud’, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 40(2) (2007) 281–340 
(Bowen Matthew) at 338.
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 authorities and citizens allows informants to mobilize public authority for per-
sonal purposes.68
Second, welfare fraud enforcement teams face a large number of tip-offs 
which they are not able to pursue because citizens often provide inaccurate 
information.69 Only a small number of welfare recipients are investigated de-
pending on the type of evidence that has been gathered against them.70
Third, empirical research in the United Kingdom has shown that after citi-
zens have provided tips, the triage of cases that will be pursued is still done 
with great discretion.71 Investigators tend to decide on the grounds of their 
experience whether a case is worth pursuing or not. In simple cases it was 
found that investigators suffer from a strong confirmation bias as they try to 
find corroborating evidence for a tip-off—regardless of the motives that drove 
the denunciation—rather than to look for alternative explanations for the 
breach under investigation. Moreover, the ubiquitous character of the involve-
ment of citizens affects the procedural guarantees of social welfare recipients 
who can be invisibly controlled at all times by neighbors, acquaintances, and 
friends in the intimacy of their private sphere.72 In conclusion, citizens’ col-
laboration with public authorities allows investigators to tap into the private 
spheres of welfare recipients but it also subjects them to a high level of social 
control and allows individuals to use law enforcement for their personal gain.
3.2 Private Actors as Detectives
While many countries appeal to citizens’ input in their investigations, not 
many Western governments have taken a step in the direction of hiring pri-
vate  detectives for fraud investigations. This has occurred for example in 
the  Netherlands and Switzerland. As this section explains, the employment of 
68 Headworth (n 4) 183. See R. Donyets-Kedar, ‘Rethinking Responsibility in Private Law’, in: 
M. Albertson Fineman, T. Mattson, and U. Anderson (eds), Privatization, Vulnerability, and 
Social Responsibility (Boca Raton: crc Press, 2016) section i.(4).
69 H. Koskela, “Don’t Mess with Texas!’: Texas Virtual Border Watch Program and the 
(botched) politics of responsibilization’, Crime, Media, Culture 7(1) (2011) 49–65 (Koskela) 
at 59.
70 English media reported for example in 2018 that 280,000 public tip-offs did not result in 
any significant action against the reported welfare recipients due to lack of evidence: 
‘Benefit Fraud ‘Witch Hunt’: 280,000 Public Tip-Offs Led to No Action Taken due to Lack 
of Evidence’. The Independent 2018, January 15. Retrieved 25 July 2019, https://www 
.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/benefit-fraud-public-tip-offs-legal-action-police-
no-evidence-dwp-work-pensions-department-a8144096.html.
71 D. Walsh, C.J. Dando, and T.C. Ormerod, ‘Triage Decision-Making by Welfare Investiga-
tors’, Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 7(1) (2018) 82–91.
72 Koskela (n 69) 55.
Downloaded from Brill.com07/30/2020 12:12:48PM
via free access
 19Outsourcing the Welfare State
<UN>
european journal of comparative law and governance 7 (2020) 5-42
private detectives can have a considerable impact on the procedural guaran-
tees of the subjects under investigation.
3.2.1 Legal Basis
In the past seven years, Dutch administrative courts have reviewed a number 
of administrative decisions that were directly or indirectly based on investiga-
tions conducted by private actors.73 In several of these cases, the admissibility 
of the evidence obtained by these private investigators was disputed due to the 
inexistence of a specific legal basis for their operation or unclear contractual 
relationship.74
The admissibility of the evidence gathered by private detectives depends 
first of all on the existence of a legislative or contractual basis. Depending on 
the existence of these legal elements, private agents may benefit from legal 
frameworks that are typically applied to private actors rather than public bod-
ies.75 In other words, contrary to public enforcement agents, private investiga-
tors who are not operating on behalf of public authorities can gather evidence 
through a wide array of techniques without prior judicial authorization.76 
They may not seize documents but upon receiving authorization to enter a 
home, private investigators may take pictures of available evidence.
In the case Vukota-Bojic before the ECtHR, a Swiss social insurance com-
pany had hired a private detective to secretly monitor a welfare recipient who 
was suspected of misinforming the authorities about her physical inability to 
work.77 Private investigators followed her for several days and prepared a 
 detailed monitoring report containing images and videos of the welfare recipi-
ent.78 The applicant in this case argued that the secret surveillance by pri-
vate detectives violated her rights under Articles 6 and 8 echr and that the 
73 See, for instance, Centrale Raad voor Beroep [Dutch High Court for Social Affairs] 16 Janu-
ary 2014, ecli:NL:crvb:2014:191 (mystery guest); ABRvS [Dutch Council of State, Admin-
istrative Law Division] 15 February 2012, ecli:NL:rvs:2012:BV5541.
74 See, for instance, Dutch Administrative High Court for Social Affairs [Centrale Raad van 
Beroep] – See AB 2014/422, Centrale Raad van Beroep, 16 September 2014, ecli: 
NL:crvb:2014:2947: in this case, the Dutch Administrative High Court decided that a local 
public body in charge of controlling the eligibility of housing allowances benefits should 
not be allowed to outsource the control of social welfare benefits to a commercial com-
pany with whom it merely had a “no cure [fraud], no pay” relationship.
75 K. Brennan-Marquez, ‘The Constitutional Limits of Private Surveillance’, University of 
Kansas Law Review 66 (2018) (Brennan-Marquez).
76 C.A. Meerts and N. Dorn, ‘Corporate Security and Private Justice: Danger Signs’, European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 17(2) (2009) 97–111 at 104.
77 Vukota-Bojić v. Switzerland, no. 61838/10, echr 2016.
78 Ibid, § 35.
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information gathered should be excluded as illegally obtained evidence. Under 
Swiss federal law, this social insurance company was qualified as a public au-
thority and was thus obliged to respect Swiss public law and the echr. There 
was nonetheless no legislative basis for the surveillance of citizens in cases of 
fraud and no information regarding the maximum duration of the surveillance 
measures or the possibility to challenge them in court. Public authorities had 
thus broad discretion in deciding which circumstances justified such surveil-
lance and for how long.
While the ECtHR did not delve into the particular use of private investiga-
tors to conduct this far-reaching investigation, it insisted on the need for legal 
provisions that legitimize this type of interference with an individual’s right to 
private life.79 When a public authority hires private detectives, it must guaran-
tee that their investigative actions respect the same restrictions and comply 
with equal safeguards as when it acts with its own civil servants. While the 
Court did not discuss the contractual relation between the public authority 
and the private detectives in the Vukota-Bojic case, it can be expected that the 
lack of a formal hierarchy and oversight of all actions of the private detectives 
will increase the risk of abuse of secret surveillance measures.
As a response to the Vukota-Bojic judgment, the Swiss legislator has provid-
ed a legislative basis for the operation of private detectives in welfare fraud 
investigations in the context of accidents and disability (Articles 43a, 43b and 
79 al. 3).80 Surveillance is currently allowed in public spaces, which includes 
balconies and gardens; private detectives may use drones, gps and other track-
ers provided that they request judicial authorization beforehand; and surveil-
lance must be limited to the period of thirty days per six months. With the 
enactment of a detailed legislative basis for surveillance, the judgment of the 
ECtHR contributed to the clarification of the expectations of Swiss beneficia-
ries but not necessarily to the improvement of their right to private life. 
This law does not fully exclude the use of illegally obtained evidence to prove 
welfare fraud. In other words, if a detective violates the limits of new legal basis 
to gather evidence of fraud, its use may still be up for debate.81
In the Netherlands, the Dutch legislator has provided a broad legal basis for 
the involvement of private actors in social welfare administration as long as 
79 See, for an analysis of the implications of this ECtHR case for the data protection of indi-
viduals, J. Evers, ‘Foreseeing Secret Surveillance in Social Security: Setting the Record 
Straight’, European Data Protection 3(4) (2017) 550–554.
80 Loi fédérale sur la partie générale du droit des assurances sociales (lpga) du 6 octobre de 
2000, RO 2019 2829, FF 2017 7003 7021.
81 See also the decision of the Swiss Federal Case on a case similar to Vukota-Bojic concern-
ing the obtainance of illegal evidence by a detective, atf 9C_806/2016.
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the core public tasks—the decisions to grant and re-claim benefits– remained 
in the hands of public authorities.82 An explicit legislative basis in the sense of 
the Vukota-Bojic judgment, can only be found in limited areas of welfare ad-
ministration (e.g., student allowances). In the Netherlands, courts have tried to 
safeguard the legality of the outsourcing of public tasks to private investigators 
not only by interpreting the existing legal basis but also by inquiring into the 
contractual relationship between public authorities and private detectives in 
order to establish the degree of public intervention in each specific case.
In the United Kingdom, local public bodies have been reported to also hire 
private detectives for fraud investigations.83 We have identified a number of 
private companies that offer to gather evidence and provide expert testimo-
ny  in welfare investigations.84 These services include obtaining proof of co-
habitation to support evidence fraud. On the website of one of these private 
detective companies, it is stated that proof of cohabitation “is needed for the 
council  to take further action as they cannot do anything without it. If you 
are  able  to prove this, then you can get justice for yourself and other UK 
tax   payers  in London.”85 Drawing on the information available on this and 
 other   private detective websites, we could conclude that the evidence gath-
ered  by  private detectives is used to initiate investigations and detect both 
small and large scale fraud cases.86 In the United Kingdom, investigation and 
surveillance practices are subject to the limits defined by the Social Security 
Fraud Act 2001 (and further elaborated in the Code of Practice on Obtaining 
Information), the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 as well as the 
Human Rights Act which makes it unlawful for a local authority to breach any 
article of the European Convention of Human Rights.87 While this legal frame-
work was not   directly designed for the actions of private detectives, these 
rules  are applicable to the Authorized Officers responsible for outsourcing 
82 Pg Awb iii, p. 334 (additional clarification article 5:11 gala) and Kamerstukkenii [Dutch 
Parliament Papers, House of Representatives], 2002/03, 28 870, nr. 3 p. 37.
83 H. Furness, 2012. ‘Councils spend £1m hiring private detectives’. The Telegraph, February 
28. Retrieved 7 January 2020, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9111049/Coun-
cils-spend-1m-hiring-private-detectives.html.
84 This is the case of EuroTech Investigation Service, see http://www.euro-tecinvestigation-
service.co.uk/welfareinvestigations.html; and Insight, see https://www.investigate.uk/
observations/ (retrieved 30 December 2019).
85 London Private Detectives. Retrieved 30 December 2019, https://london-privatedetec-
tives.co.uk/investigations-in-london/proof-of-cohabitation/.
86 ejm Investigations. Retrieved 30 December 2019, https://www.ejminvestigations.co.uk/
benefit-fraud.html.
87 See J. Rosenblom, ‘Local Benefit Fraud’, in: A. Doig (ed.), Fraud: The Counter Fraud Practi-
tioner’s Handbook (London: Routledge, 2012) 157–188.
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 investigations.88 When the legal framework does not apply directly to private 
detectives, it is important to analyze the underlying contractual relationship 
between public bodies and private actors. In other words, the existence of a 
legal basis for the employment of private detectives does not exclude the need 
for a clear contract between these private actors and public authorities. In 
2014, the Dutch High Court for Social Affairs excluded the evidence of fraud 
collected by the private detectives, as it had been obtained “in violation of the 
principles of good administration.”89 The relationship between public and pri-
vate bodies was in that specific case unclear and the court could not assert 
whether the detectives had received clear instructions and supervision from 
the public authority that was ultimately accountable to the investigation. Fur-
thermore, the private detectives only had in this case a performance-based 
contract which provided strong incentives to find evidence of fraud and raised 
one of the oldest questions in the context of privatization: the divergence of 
incentives between private actors (maximize profit) and the pursuit of the 
public good.90 In this case, the Court excluded it based on the contractual 
 relationship between the parties and the need to draw limits to the outsourc-
ing of public tasks.91 In other Dutch cases of welfare fraud involving private 
detectives, the outsourcing to private agents was based on specific legislative 
and contractual dispositions and it was proven the public body gave specific 
instructions on what kind of investigative measures could be undertaken.92 
88 Department of Work and Pensions, 2016. ‘Social Security Fraud: Code of Practice on Ob-
taining Information’. Retrieved 7 January 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publica-
tions/social-security-fraud-code-of-practice-on-obtaining-information.
89 Centrale Raad van Beroep, 16 September 2014, ecli:NL:crvb:2014:2947.
90 See J.B. Goodman, and G.W. Loveman, ‘Does Privatization Serve the Public Interest?’, Har-
vard Business Review, Nov-Dec (1991) https://hbr.org/1991/11/does-privatization-serve-the-
public-interest. See also J. Barkan, Corporate Sovereignty: Law and Government under 
Capitalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013).
91 The court considered that the evidence supporting the decision of the public body was 
illegally obtained and violated Article 7(4) of the Dutch Statute on Employment and So-
cial Benefits (Wet werk en bijstand). See, for further information on evidence gathering in 
Dutch administrative law, Y.E. Schuurmans, ‘Onrechtmatig verkregen bewijsmateriaal in 
het bestuursrecht’ [Illegally Obtained Evidence in Dutch Administrative Law], Ars Aequi 
(May 2017) 388–399 [in Dutch].
92 See, for instance, First-instance court of Rotterdam, 6.10.2015, ecli:NL:rbrot:2015:7050 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:7050&keywo
rd=investiga [in Dutch]; Centrale Raad van Beroep, 2 december 2015, AB 2016/77 (m.n.v. 
H. E. Bröring). The Dutch Administrative High Court (Centrale Raad van Beroep) is the 
court of appeal for a part of the administrative disputes in the Netherlands. It judges cases 
governed by the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) and it is in 
particular competent to decide appeals involving social security and social assistance 
disputes.
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When this hierarchical or employment relationship is verified, private investi-
gators are nonetheless not allowed to go beyond the limits of what would be 
allowed to a public enforcement agent.
In the United States, a number of states have recently started enacting legis-
lation to allow private companies to investigate public assistance fraud. This is 
the case of Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, and Wyoming which recently passed 
laws allowing these state to hire a private contractor to check the eligibility of 
individuals participating in state public assistance programs like Medicaid.93 
These private actors are contracted for the use of ‘computerized control sys-
tems’ and may simply alert the state that a person is ineligible for welfare. State 
legislation defines the scope and limits of the outsourcing of powers.
To conclude, the existence of a clear legal basis is essential to legitimize the 
involvement of both public and private actors in surveillance activities. It is 
worth noting that in December 2019, the ECtHR also discussed the degree of 
specificity of judicial authorizations to conduct surveillance, stating that “the 
Court is of the opinion that secret surveillance being a serious interference 
with a person’s right to respect for private life, a judicial authorisation serving 
as its basis cannot be drafted in such vague terms as to leave room for specula-
tion and assumptions with regard to its content and, most importantly, to the 
person in whose respect the given measure is being applied94
3.2.2 Evidence-gathering and Fundamental Rights
Outsourcing has allowed public institutions to expand the scope of their 
 enforcement powers and benefit from the more generous legal framework 
 applicable to private actors, for example, in the context of evidence gather-
ing.95 Evidence-gathering in administrative procedures is in general character-
ized by fairly lenient limits as long as the public body collects the necessary 
information according to the general principles of good administration (e.g., 
93 J. Fifield, ‘What Happens When States Go Hunting for Welfare Fraud’, Pew Research Cen-
ter (May 24, 2017), available at https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
blogs/stateline/2017/05/24/what-happens-when-states-go-hunting-for-welfare-fraud 
. See, for example, hope (Act to Restore Hope Opportunity and Prosperity for Everyone), 
Mississippi Legislature, 2017, http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2017/html/HB/ 
1000-1099/HB1090PS.htm, Section 3.
94 Hambardzumyan v. Armenia (Application no. 43478/11) echr 417 [2019] § 65.
95 The limits of evidence-gathering tend to be even more lenient when evidence is gathered 
by private parties. For example, in the United States, private investigators will not be 
bound by the Fourth Amendment; therefore, information uncovered by private citizens 
without the consent of the investigated party may still be admissible in court. See Bren-
nan-Marquez (n 75) 485–522.
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transparency).96 The absence of clear limits to evidence gathering is  particularly 
challenging in the field of social welfare as much of this evidence does not 
meet national criminal law standards. This information can nonetheless be 
used indirectly to initiate the prosecution of a citizen for welfare fraud crimes.97 
Furthermore, evidence-gathering strategies used by private investigators (such 
as the thorough surveillance described in the Vukota-Bojic case) are likely to 
put at stake a number of fundamental rights, particularly national procedural 
guarantees (due process, equality of arms) and the right to respect for private 
and family life (including privacy).98
Although the ECtHR in the Vukota-Bojic case found a breach of the right to 
respect for private life (and hence privacy) in intrusive fraud investigations 
conducted by private detectives, this finding did not automatically result in the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.99 Article 6 of the echr does not en-
tail specific rules on the admissibility and assessment of pieces of evidence 
and the Court is not required to correct any error of fact or law made by na-
tional courts. Considering its nature as an international human rights court, 
the ECtHR focuses on the defense rights of the applicant and the importance 
of the evidence in question.100 If the applicant was given an opportunity to 
challenge the authenticity of the evidence and to oppose its use in the national 
proceedings, it is unlikely that the ECtHR will consider that the right to a fair 
trial (Article 6 echr) has been infringed. A similar position has been visible in 
civil cases in the United Kingdom where the admissibility of evidence ob-
tained by private investigators was unsuccessfully challenged on the grounds 
of the breach of human rights.101 English courts have made a proportionality 
assessment in this type of cases, weighing the rights of the individual against 
96 See H.E. Bröring, ‘De Bestuurlijke Boete’ [The Administrative Fine] (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer, 2005) 159–160.
97 See C. Meerts, ‘Over pragmatisme en strategie’ [On Pragmatism and Strategy], Tijdschrift 
voor Criminologie (2014(4)) [in Dutch]; Burkoff (n 65) 628.
98 See also J.Herveg and J-M. van Gysehem, ‘La protection des données à caractère personnel 
en droit européen – Chronique de jurisprudence (2018)’, Journal Européen des Droits de 
l’Homme 1 (2019) 33–88, 21.
99 Vukota-Bojić v. Switzerland, no. 61838/10, § 93, echr 2016: ‘It is not […] the role of the 
Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence – for 
example, evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law – may be admissible. 
The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including 
the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair.’
100 See I. Langford, ‘Fair Trial: The History of an Idea’, Journal of Human Rights 8(1) (2009) 
37–52.
101 Ian Trumper, ‘Accounts and Management Fraud’, in: A. Doig (ed.), Fraud: The Counter 
Fraud Practitioner’s Handbook (London: Routledge, 2012) 85–105, referring in particular to 
Jones v. Warwick University [2003] 1 wrl 954 [2003] ewca Civ 151 where the judge found 
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the harm to others within the framework of justice.102 In the Netherlands, 
Dutch administrative courts have reached different decisions, determining the 
exclusion of evidence on the grounds of the violation of human rights, namely 
the right to a fair trial.103
Although we understand the need to guarantee the economy of judicial pro-
ceedings and the possibility to admit illegally obtained evidence based on a 
proportionality assessment, we contend that the circumstances under which 
evidence has been collected, should be taken into account if they cast doubt 
on its reliability and accuracy. This will be the case when private actors have 
strong commercial incentives to find fraud and the public oversight of private 
investigative actions is limited. In these cases, courts should be extra vigilant as 
potential interferences with the obtained material and the violation of the in-
dividuals’ guarantees.
3.2.3 Legitimacy Deficit and Good Administration
Several critics of privatization have argued that public officials should be pre-
ferred to private contractors not only because they can perform certain tasks 
better but also because their identity as public agents has an intrinsic value 
which imbues them with enhanced political legitimacy.104 The outsourcing of 
public services is nevertheless often justified by the demand for enhanced ex-
pertise and efficiency which confers legitimacy to private actors.105 When ap-
plying this criterion to social welfare fraud investigations, it can be questioned 
whether this field requires enhanced expertise.106 Rather, social welfare inves-
tigations aim to verify simple facts: does the beneficiary live alone or does this 
individual cohabitate? Is the income of the beneficiary correct? Is the benefi-
ciary living at her registered address? These factual investigations are time-
consuming and can be easily optimized with the assistance of digital research 
that the method used to obtain evidence was unlawful but the conduct was not so outra-
geous as to exclude the evidence and affect the fairness of the trial.
102 Ian Trumper, ‘Accounts and Management Fraud’, in: A. Doig (ed.), Fraud: The Counter 
Fraud Practitioner’s Handbook (London: Routledge, 2012) 85–105.
103 Centrale Raad van Beroep, 16 September 2014, ecli:NL:crvb:2014:2947.
104 A. Harel and A. Porat, ‘Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-to-Be-Met Challenges for 
Law and Economics’, Cornell Law Review 96(4) (2011) 749–787 at 769, 777.
105 See Donnelly (n 9) 342; K. Yeung, ‘Privatizing Competition Regulation’, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 18 (1998) 581–615.
106 A. Outhuijse, ‘De introductie van private partijen in het bouwtoezicht. Waar moeten we 
aan denken?’ [The introduction of private actors in the supervision of the construction 
sector], TO 3 (2013) 79 [in Dutch].
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techniques that can select potential candidates for formal investigations.107 
This selection phase demands advanced digital skills and equipment which 
may or may not always be present in public bodies.108
The employment of private actors can still raise concerns regarding a num-
ber of values and principles of administrative law such as openness, transpar-
ency, impartiality, rationality, and accessibility of administrative decisions.109 
Furthermore, the existence of a legal basis for outsourcing does not take away 
the fact that private detectives are driven by private interests rather than the 
pursuit of the public interest.110 We expect this misalignment of interests to 
occur in particular when the remuneration of private detectives is dependent 
on how much fraud they are able to detect or private companies are able to 
draw economic benefits from the data they collected in the context of investi-
gations.111 Multiple questions will arise then in this context: Will private detec-
tives also be willing to collect exculpatory evidence? Will they comply with 
rules on data-protection, even when this is detrimental to the successful of 
their risk-assessments?
3.3 Private Actors as Providers of Data-Driven Enforcement Systems
The use of automated systems is currently pervasive both in the public and 
private sectors.112 The involvement of private technology companies ranges 
from those providing specialized fraud detection services to the provision 
of  software.113 However, technology companies are increasingly involved in 
public decision-making as they design integrated solutions that are used for 
107 Predictive analytics is also being used in the United States for example to detect cases of 
illegal conversion of houses, building inspections for public safety hazards, fighting pre-
scription drug epidemic: See A. Howard, ‘Predictive Data Analytics Is Saving Lives and 
Taxpayer Dollars in New York City’. O’Reilly 2012, June 26. Retrieved 19 December 2019, 
https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/predictive-data-analytics-big-data-nyc.
108 See, generally, on the interaction between public and private actors: O. Butler, ‘Obliga-
tions Imposed on Private Parties by the gdpr and UK Data Protection Law: Blurring the 
Public-Private Divide’, European Public Law 24(3) (2018) 555–572.
109 Freeman (n 16) 814, 818, 819.
110 Bowen Matthew (n 67) 338.
111 See, generally, J-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, ‘Privatization and Incentives’, Journal of Law, Eco-
nomics, and Organisation 7(special issue) (1991) 84–105; N. Davidson, ‘Contracts in the 
Privatization of Social Welfare: The Case of Housing’, Yale Law & Policy Review 24(2) 
(2006) (Davidson) 263–316.
112 See, for instance, AI Now Institute. ‘Litigating Algorithms: Challenging Government Use 
of Algorithmic Decision Systems’. 2018. Retrieved 19 December 2019, https://ainowinsti-
tute.org/litigatingalgorithms.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ52-PZAH], p. 5.
113 Human Rights Watch, ‘May 2019 Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme 
Poverty &Human Rights Regarding His Thematic Report on Digital Technology, Social 
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 government data and services.114 It is in this context that we observe a novel 
form of privatization of welfare fraud investigations in the United Kingdom, 
the United States, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In the last five years, the 
media has discussed the use of automated systems in social welfare fraud pre-
vention.115 Public bodies use for example data sharing and data matching sys-
tems that seek to break down longstanding data-silos that may be preventing 
not only a joined approach to public services but also the detection of incon-
sistent information and thus fraud.116 However, these systems are not always 
developed by public bodies. Instead, they are acquired from Big Tech compa-
nies such as ibm. To illustrate, the ibm InfoSphere Master Data Management 
has been employed in Camden (United Kingdom) to develop a residents’ index 
that links data sources from across Camden and uses probabilistic matching 
techniques for identity verification and fraud detection.117 This has been used 
to detect school admission fraud in situations where individuals falsely claim 
to live close to a popular school so that their children can get a place. The index 
developed by ibm checks all the addresses that a family has given to each of 
their services and establishes whether there are discrepancies. If the system 
Protection & Human Rights’. Retrieved 29 July 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/pages/
home.aspx (Human Rights Watch).
114 See J. Hudson, ‘Digitising the Structures of Government: The UK’s Information Age Gov-
ernment Agenda’, Policy and Polity 30(4) (2002) 513–531.
115 Data Justice Lab, 2018. ‘Digital Technologies and the Welfare State’. September 14. 
 Retrieved 19 December 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Epoverty/Unit-
edKingdom/2018/Academics/DataJusticeLabCardiffUniversity.pdf (Data Justice Lab).
116 Department for Work and Pensions, 2019. ‘Individual Electoral Registration –  Confirmation 
dwp Data Matching Methodology’. Retrieved 19 December 2019. https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/262931/ERTP_ 
CONFIRMATION_DATA_MATCHING_METHODOLOGY.pdf. The largest database in the 
Netherlands is SyRi (a Risk Indication System), which is managed by the Minister of 
Social Affairs and combines data from various local and federal public bodies to de-
sign risk profiles based on algorithms to combat social welfare fraud. See P. Olsthoo-
rn, ‘Big Data voor fraudebestrijding’ [Big Data for Fraud Prevention], Working Paper 
wrr no. 21. Retrieved 15 July 2019, https://www.wrr.nl/publicaties/working-papers/ 
2016/04/28/big-data-voor-fraudebestrijding. See M. Hijink, 2018. ‘Hoe controleert de 
gemeente of jij fraudeert?’ [How Does Local Government Check if You Are Cheating], 
nrc, April 6. Retrieved 19 December 2019, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/04/06/hoe- 
controleert-de-gemeente-of-jij-fraudeert-a1598455. The Netherlands Scientific Coun-
cil for Government Policy published a policy brief, in which it highlights the use of 
Big Data analytics in security practice: See D. Broeders, E. Schrijvers, and E. Hirsch 
Ballin, ‘Big Data and Security Policies: Serving Security, Protecting Freedom’. 2017. 
 Retrieved 15 July 2019, https://english.wrr.nl/publications/policy-briefs/2017/01/31/big- 
data-and-security-policies-serving-security-protecting-freedom.
117 Data Justice Lab (n 115).
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raises a red flag, an audit team can investigate further. Similar services are pro-
vided to municipalities in the Netherlands by Totta Data Lab and Ynformed. As 
mentioned earlier, private detective companies are also allowed to employ au-
tomated systems when monitoring welfare recipients in Switzerland. On the 
other side of the Atlantic, the California state legislature amended the Welfare 
and Institutions Code in 2017 to replace fingerprint imaging with an “automat-
ed, nonbiometric” method for verifying the identity of applicants to the Cal-
WORKs program, which provides cash assistance to needy families. Public au-
thorities also relied here on a private company (Pondera solutions) to conduct 
a pilot of a cloud-based identity verification system (Knowledge Based Au-
thentication System). This pilot raised several legal concerns as the private 
company refused to explain how the data was analyzed, making it difficult for 
the broader public to assess the accuracy of the system.118 In addition, the sys-
tem required the collection of highly sensitive data.119
Fraud investigations are not yet fully automated and it is not the aim of this 
section to explain in detail exactly what specific technology is being used. 
Rather, our focus lies in the legal issues raised by the delegation of public tasks 
(fraud inspections) to private companies through the contracting of technol-
ogy. In May 2019, Human Rights Watch submitted a report to the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty & Human Rights explaining how states 
throughout the world were delegating key welfare functions (including deter-
mination of eligibility and benefits levels and fraud investigations) to automat-
ed decision-making systems.120 In the cases described in the report, citizens 
targeted by these systems were not tech-savvy, integrated underrepresent-
ed  groups, and were directly and indirectly stigmatized and discriminated. 
Moreover, the automated systems involved an opaque analysis of large datas-
ets containing a wide range of sensitive data.121
At the resemblance of the two previous forms of involving private actors in 
welfare fraud investigations, the use of digital technology developed by private 
companies changes the way in which welfare fraud investigations are conduct-
ed in several ways. First, it is not always clear what data these technologies 
rely upon to establish the probability that someone will commit fraud. Fraud 
investigators will primarily consider past statistics, for example, data stating 
that a certain group of citizens (e.g., pensioners) is less likely to commit 
118 As a consequence, the California Department of Social Services decided not to imple-
ment this automated system.
119 Human Rights Watch (n 113).
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
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fraud.122 However, it may be difficult to obtain specific information for exam-
ple, on the weight of certain data in the calculation of a risk score.123 The pro-
cess by which data systems are developed and then implemented by investiga-
tors may not always be accessible to the public.124 While public authorities 
could hypothetically work on improving the transparency of these systems by 
requesting contractors to disclose proprietary information, this is not always 
possible in practice. Moreover, the opacity of these digital systems is reinforced 
by the absence of information regarding the oversight mechanisms in place.125 
This opacity is  particularly serious when it is directly or indirectly used by 
fraud teams to make decisions that affect individuals’ ability to receive welfare 
benefits. Therefore, the existence of public-private partnerships makes it diffi-
cult for citizens to scrutinize automated systems, reduces the accountability of 
public authorities, and the protection of citizens against their human rights 
impacts.126
Second, the use of complex data-driven systems is susceptible of violating 
fundamental rights. The right to non-discrimination (Article 14 echr, Article 1 
of the Additional Protocol), the right to private and family life (Article 8 echr) 
including personal data can be violated by automated systems in multiple 
ways. Risk assessments often result in profiling and thus the stigmatization of 
certain groups and minorities who are thought to present a higher risk of 
fraudulent behavior.127 Also, automated assessments are not always focused on 
122 Department for Work and Pensions, ‘The Results of the Area Benefit Review and the Qual-
ity Support Team from April 2000 to March 2001’ (London, Analytical Services Division 
and National Statistics, 2002). 
and the Quality Support Team from April to March, London: Analytical Ser-vices Divi-
sion and National Statistics, dwp.
123 Many of these concerns were raised in State v Loomis 881 NW2d 749 (Wis 2016) 754 (Unit-
ed States). See, for a broader discussion of the opacity of these systems, F. Pasquale, The 
Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2015); H-W. Liu, Ching-Fu-Lin, and Y-J. Chen, ‘Beyond 
State v Loomis: Artificial Intelligence, Government Algorithmization and Accountability’, 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 27(2) (2019) 122–141.
124 See S.K. Katyal, ‘The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy’, Cornell Law Review 104(5) (2019) 
1183–1280.
125 Data Justice Lab (n 115).
126 D. Reisman, J. Schultz, K. Crawford, and M. Whittaker. ‘Algorithmic Impact Assessments: 
A Practical Framework for Public Agency Accountability’. AI Now 2018, April 13. Retrieved 
19 December 2019, https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf (Reisman and others).
127 Lord Grabiner, The Informal Economy (London: HM Treasury-government publication, 
2002) 14; P. Dornan, and J. Hudson, ‘Welfare Governance in the Surveillance Society: 
A  Positive-Realistic Cybercriticalist View’, Social Policy and Administration 37(5) (2003) 
468–482 (Dornan and Hudson) at 474.
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establishing behavior (i.e., whether an individual abuse the system) but on 
predicting it.128 This means that selected citizens will be closely watched be-
cause their personal characteristics (e.g., age group, gender, ethnicity) place 
them in a category of people (e.g., middle-age women) that is more likely to 
commit fraud. On the grounds of these probabilistic models and historical 
data, these individuals will then be more intensely scrutinized and often mar-
ginalized under the guise of objective evidence-based analyses.129 Probabilis-
tic models that act on group characteristics rather than a qualitative assess-
ment of an individual’s characteristics may contravene the Human Rights Act 
(in the United Kingdom), the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the 
echr.130 In addition, predictive systems reinforce stereotypes, the belief that 
averages are more important than morality, and the sense of justice that re-
quires evidence of wrongdoing rather than the probability thereof.131
Although governments claim that they gather anonymous data to build au-
tomated systems, the risk of re-identification of data by private companies is 
real. The data in public services, particularly in the field of social welfare, in-
cludes very sensitive information which if re-identified, can have important 
consequences and result in continued stigmatization.132 Digital trails left dur-
ing a fraud investigation may determine someone’s life chances to a signifi-
cant extent (for example, if there is online information on the suspicion that 
an individual committed fraud, her reputation or credit score may be seriously 
affected).133
128 R. Peeters and M. Schuilenberg, ‘Machine Justice: Governing Security through the Bureau-
cracy of Algorithms’, Information Polity 23(3) (2018) 267–280.
129 S.J. Prins and A. Reich, ‘Can we Avoid Reductionism in Risk Reduction?’, Theoretical Crimi-
nology 22(2) (2018) 258–278 at 259; M. Hamilton, ‘The Biased Algorithm: Evidence of Dis-
parate Impact on Hispanics’, American Criminal Law Review 56(4) (2019) 1553–1578 at 1559.
130 Dornan and Hudson (n 128) 473.
131 S. Barocas and A.D. Selbst, ‘Big Data’s Disparate Impact’, California Law Review 104(3) 
(2016) 671–732. See also, discussing the morality implications of predictive models, 
F. Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2006).
132 S. Wachter, ‘Normative Challenges of Identification in the Internet of Things: Privacy, Pro-
filing, Discrimination, and the gdpr’, Computer Law & Security Review 34(3) (2018) 
436–449.
133 This concern has been raised in the immigration context, as there are rumors that 
Palantir is providing data collected for other purposes that can be later used to de-
tect undocumented workers during raids: See E. Anzilotti. ‘Emails Show that ice Uses 
Palantir Technology to Detain Undocumented Immigrants: wnyc Report’. Fast Com-
pany 2019, July 6. Retrieved 5 August 2019, https://www.fastcompany.com/90377603/
ice-uses-palantir-tech-to-detain-immigrants-wnyc-report.
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Third, the outsourcing of public tasks may result in the expansion or reduc-
tion of discretionary powers beyond the original intent of the legislator.134 Ex-
isting social welfare legislation was drafted with human decision-makers in 
mind.135 In the context of automated systems or risk assessments that support 
decision-making, we will often see or fear different interpretations of the law. 
The interpretation of vague and indeterminate terms will be primarily focused 
on past data analytics (e.g., if someone has committed fraud once or belongs to 
an ethnic group that has abused the system in the past, the system may flag 
this individual as a potential abuser). Although many of these objections are 
applicable to both public and private automated systems, the involvement of 
private companies in welfare investigations enhances the risk of unfair, dispro-
portionate and discriminatory treatment due to the misalignment of interests 
and values between public and private parties.
4 A Normative Framework for the Privatization of Public 
Enforcement
In this section, we offer a normative framework that seeks to reframe the inter-
vention of private actors so as to ensure that welfare fraud investigations are 
fair, transparent, non-discriminatory, and conducted in the strict pursuit of the 
public interest.
4.1 Limited Outsourcing of Inherently Governmental Tasks
As a first normative limit to the privatization of public enforcement, we sug-
gest limiting the outsourcing of certain public tasks to private actors, particu-
larly the task of investigating welfare fraud (including the surveillance of indi-
viduals). We argue that the detection and sanctioning of fraud are inherently 
governmental tasks because they affect the exercise of fundamental rights that 
can be more adequately protected by public authorities than private actors. 
“Inherently governmental tasks” have been traditionally presented in the lit-
erature in civil and common law countries as tasks that should be reserved to 
134 See A. Le Sueur, ‘Robot Government: Automated Decision-Making and its Implications’, 
in: A. Horne and A. Le Sueur (eds), Parliament: Legislation and Accountability (Oxford and 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2016) Part 2(9.).
135 M. Hildebrandt, ‘Law as Information in the Era of Data-Driven Agency’, Modern Law 
 Review 79(1) (2016) 1–30.
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public bodies and that, as such, cannot be outsourced or require a very strict 
and detailed legal basis for the outsourcing of specific tasks.136
The concept of ‘inherently governmental tasks’ is closely connected to the 
idea that some public tasks are particularly designed for the benefit of the 
whole collectivity.”137 This concept has been defined in the United States as 
“a function that it is so intimately related to the public interest as to require 
performance by Federal Government employees.”138 Under the “nature of the 
function” test, a task will be regarded as “inherently governmental” if it involves 
“exercising sovereign power,” for example, that of depriving someone of liberty 
in the name of public safety.139 Our position draws on the positon adopted in 
2014 by the Dutch High Court for Social Affairs. In a case involving private de-
tectives, the Court stated that while the Dutch Social Welfare Act offered 
room for the delegation of administrative tasks in general, it also stated that 
law enforcement and fraud investigations constituted a core task of the public 
administration. As such, this task could not be delegated without a more spe-
cific legal provision.140
The delimitation of “inherently governmental tasks” evokes the traditional 
debate on the divide between public and private spheres which has been 
136 See, for instance, J.R. Luckey, V. Bailey Grasso, and K.M. Manuel, ‘Inherently Governmen-
tal Functions and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options 
for Congress’. Congressional Research Service 2010, February 1. Retrieved 19 December 
2019, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40641.pdf – discussing the statutory and poli-
cy definitions of “inherently governmental function”; F. van Ommeren and G. Jurgens, 
‘The Public-Private Divide in English and Dutch Law: A Multifunctional and Context-
Dependent Divide’, Cambridge Law Journal 71(1) (2012) (van Ommeren and Jurgens) 172–
199. See, generally, P.R. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of Government 
Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do about it (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2007); D. Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).
137 C. Harlow, “Public’ and ‘Private’ Law: Definition without Distinction’, Modern Law Review 
43(3) (1980) 241–265; K. Chan, The Public-Private Nature of Charity Law (London: Blooms-
bury, 2016) 181.
138 M. Tirard, ‘Privatization and Public Law Values: A View from France’, Indiana Journal of 
Global Studies15 (2008) 285–304 at 292. See, however, for the United Kingdom, T. Prosser, 
‘Social Limits to Privatization’, Brooklyn Journal of International Law 21(1) (1998) 213–242 at 
218, analyzing the limits of privatization from a comparative perspective and stating that 
the “United Kingdom experience shows quite clearly that there is no core of governmen-
tal activity which cannot be privatized.”. A functional approach to outsourcing was ap-
plied in the United Kingdom in R v. Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin [1987] 
Q.B. 815 (CA) 847.
139 O’Carroll (n 16).
140 Centrale Raad van Beroep, 16 September 2014, ecli:NL:crvb:2014:2947.
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 particularly visible in civil law countries.141 Although this debate has been dis-
missed as obsolete, it still offers a framework and a vocabulary that helps us 
distinguish between tasks to which public law principles apply and govern-
mental tasks that cannot be outsourced.142 The public law-private law divide 
has been inspired by the ideological perception that there are certain missions 
and values of public law that should not be attributed to other entities since 
they are inherent to the pursuit of the common good, not private advantage.143 
The definition of the limits of the public realm is highly dependent on time, 
place, culture, reigning interests, and needs.144 It is thus a normative question 
which has changed throughout time and is historically contingent.145
The provision of social assistance itself was traditionally in the hands of 
private actors, charities, and churches. In the nineteenth century, states relied 
on private charities to provide social assistance to the needy.146 However, as 
private benevolent societies became unable to meet the increasing needs of 
expanding populations, in particular after the Great Depression, the Welfare 
State emerged. In modern days, most Western countries have included social 
welfare in the imperium of public law. Although social security and public 
141 van Ommeren and Jurgens (n 137); L. van den Berge, ‘Rethinking the Public-Private Divide 
in the Age of Governmentality and Network Governance: A Comparative Approach of 
French, English and Dutch Law’, European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 
5(2) (2018) 119–143.
142 C.M. Flood and B. Thomas, ‘Blurring of the Public/Private Divide: The Canadian Chapter’, 
European Journal of Health Law 17(3) (2010) 257–278; D. Kennedy, ‘The Stages of the De-
cline of the Public/Private Distinction’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 130(6) (1982) 
1349–1357.
143 J.S. Bell, ‘Comparative Administrative Law’, in: M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds.), 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) 1260–1286 at 1262. See also H-W. Micklitz, 
‘The Public/Private Divide’, in: L Poiares Maduro, K. Tuori, and S. Sankari (eds), Transla-
tional Law: Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2014) 271–306.
144 See, for an analysis of the definition of “public interest”, J. Johnston. ‘Whose Interests? 
Why Defining the ‘Public Interest’ Is Such A Challenge’. The Conversation 2017, September 
21. Retrieved 19 December 2019, https://theconversation.com/whose-interests-why-defin-
ing-the-public-interest-is-such-a-challenge-84278; S.M. King, B.S. Chilton, and G.E. Rob-
erts, ‘Reflections on Defining the Public Interest’, Administration & Society 41(8) (2010) 
954–978.
145 B.P. Vermeulen, ‘De publieke taak: een veel-zijdig begrip’ [The Governmental Function: 
A Multi-faceted Concept], in: J.W. Sap, B.P. Vermeulen, and C.M. Zoethout (eds), De Pub-
lieke Taak (2003) 13, 21 [in Dutch].
146 M. Estrin Gilman, ‘Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare’, California Law 
Review 89(3) (2001) 569–642, (Estrin Gilman) 583–584. See, generally, E.P. Hennock, The 
Origin of the Welfare State in England and Germany, 1850–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); A. Briggs, ‘The Welfare State in Historical Perspective’, European 
Journal of Sociology 2(2) (1961) 221–258.
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 assistance have been for decades at the heart of the welfare state,147 it can be 
argued that the provision of assistance and the control of eligibility and the 
enforcement of social security laws have different natures. The former has be-
come increasingly instrumental and thus susceptible of being delegated to pri-
vate actors.148 The latter has remained in the hands of public authorities as it 
involves sanctions. It would be difficult to argue that every aspect of social wel-
fare should be kept in public hands. Indeed, the existence of a right to certain 
public services does not mean that there is a constitutional anti-privatization 
framework that draws the borders for contracting with private entities for the 
provision of public services.149 Instead, welfare pluralism has become part of 
the larger debate on how to reduce the costs of the welfare state.150 Neverthe-
less, the control of eligibility and law enforcement are decisive to the exercise 
of the right to social security. They relate directly to the provision of public as-
sistance which guarantees the survival, education, and basic living conditions 
of citizens.
Allowing private citizens to monitor welfare recipients or encouraging citi-
zens to denunciate neighbors and family members further stigmatizes social 
welfare and it opens the door to multiple forms of abuse. Moreover, the out-
sourcing of public enforcement, particularly when primarily guided by opaque 
and biased data-driven systems, is susceptible of interfering with citizens’ fun-
damental rights.151 Automated systems acquired from private companies 
should therefore be developed according to ethical standards and be aligned 
with the same public values and rules that characterize public law enforce-
ment. As the ECtHR has underlined, public authorities should not evade their 
obligations by outsourcing tasks to private parties, the standards and underly-
ing values of law enforcement must be the same regardless of whether the en-
forcement is performed directly by a public authority or a private party with 
147 C.A. Reich, ‘Midnight Welfare Search and the Social Security Act’, Yale Law Journal 72(7) 
(1962) 1347–1360 at 1359.
148 A.C. Aman Jr., ‘Globalization and the Privatization of Welfare Administration in Indiana’, 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 20(1) (2013) 377–424; A. Eleveld and O. van Vliet, 
‘The Dutch Welfare State: Recent Reforms in Social Security and Labour Law’, Diritto Pub-
blico Comparato ed Europeo 4 (2014) 1371–1399.
149 J.M. Beermann, ‘Privatization and Political Accountability’, Fordham Urban Law Jour-
nal  28(5) (2001) 1507–1557, 1510; A. Volokh, ‘Privatization and the Elusive Employee- 
Contractor Distinction’, U.C. Davis Law Review 46(1) (2012) 133–208 at 138.
150 P. van Aerschot, ‘The Privatization of Social Services’, in: M. Koskenniemi (ed.), The Finn-
ish Yearbook of International Law: Volume viii (1997) (The Hague: Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 1999) 457–472.
151 See M. Hu, ‘Algorithmic Jim Crow’, Fordham Law Review 86(2) (2018) 633–696.
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delegated powers.152 Automated systems should be for example audited and 
controlled so that public authorities can assess according to what values and 
categories welfare recipients are being classified.153 Their private character and 
the proprietary nature of their software cannot be evoked as an excuse to apply 
a different legal regime. Indeed, the legitimacy of privatization and outsourc-
ing depends on the application of the same rules to public and private enforc-
ers, including in the context of data collection and processing.154
Finally, there is limited evidence that the privatization and optimization of 
social welfare enforcement can have beneficial effects decreasing poverty and 
the dependency of individuals on assistance.155 Instead, the privatization of 
social welfare appears to affect directly the nature of the state-citizen relation-
ship converting it into a contractual relationship with reduced levels of ac-
countability, legitimacy, and transparency.156
4.2 Accountability Mechanisms
In the digital age, enhanced transparency has been often viewed as the re-
sponse to the use of automated systems.157 Data-driven systems and other 
opaque strategies developed by private bodies should benefit not only from 
enhanced transparency but also clear accountability mechanisms that allow 
citizens to understand how a decision was made.158
152 Van Vondel v The Netherlands, no. 38258/03, § 49, echr 2007.
153 T. Zarsky, ‘The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Examine 
Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making’, Science Technology 
and Human Values 41(1) (2016) 118–132. See also D. Citron and F. Pasquale, ‘The Scored 
Society: Due process for automated predictions’, Washington Law Review 89(1) (2014) 1–33; 
B.A. Williams, C.F. Brooks, and Y. Shmargad, ‘How Algorithms Discriminate Based on Data 
They Lack: Challenges, Solutions, and Policy Implications’, Journal of Information Policy 8 
(2018) 78–115.
154 See N. Purtova, ‘Between the gdpr and the Police Directive: Navigating through the Maze 
of Information Sharing in Public–Private Partnerships’, International Data Privacy Law 
8(1) (2018) 52–68.
155 G. Craig, ‘The Privatization of Human Misery’, Critical Social Policy 18(54) (1998) 51–76. 
The literature has instead suggested that the privatization of different sectors may be det-
rimental to poor consumers and citizens: See M. Drakeford, ‘The Poverty of Privatization: 
Poorest Customers of the Privatized Gas, Water and Electricity Industries’, Critical Social 
Policy 17(51) (1997) 115–132.
156 P.M. Larkin, ‘The Legislative Arrival and Future of Workfare: The Welfare Reform Act 
2009’, Journal of Social Security Law 18(1) (2011) 11, 28.
157 R. Brauneis and E.P. Goodman, ‘Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City’, Yale Journal 
of Law and Technology 20 (2018) 103–176.
158 See M. Perel and N. Elkin-Koren, ‘Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic 
Enforcement’, Florida Law Review 69 (2017) 181–221.
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Thus far, Dutch public bodies at the central level have sought to legitimize 
contracts with private parties by disclosing information regarding the exis-
tence of a digital investigation phase. They have also informed the Parliament 
and the public that they were indeed building “data warehouses” about citi-
zens and used various queries and risk profiles to detect high risks of fraud.159 
In the United States, there is a growing debate on the introduction of Algorith-
mic Impact Assessments.160 These assessments aim to reduce the opacity of 
automated systems and would require each public authority to publicly list 
and describe all existing and proposed automated decision systems, including 
their purpose, reach, and potential impacts on identifiable groups or individu-
als. These systems would allow the public to review and audit the algorithms 
used by agencies. The effectiveness of these algorithmic impact assessments 
depends nonetheless on an increase in the internal expertise and capacity of 
public authorities to evaluate the fairness and risk of discrimination of systems 
they procure.161
Accountability mechanisms should also include information on the super-
vision of private companies, the responsibility taken for potential mistakes, 
and an assessment of the human rights impacts of employed automated sys-
tems. The need to accept this responsibility should be proportionate to the 
degree of involvement of public bodies in the process and the benefit they 
could potentially draw from their contracts with private companies.162
An important question that arises is whether a system of enhanced ac-
countability can address the legitimacy deficit of private actors and guarantee 
that the outsourcing of public tasks does not have a negative impact on the 
public interest.163 As Jody Freeman has explained, privatization does not need 
to be accompanied by a reduction in accountability. Instead, public bodies 
should seek to “publicize” certain services by imposing public values and rules 
on private providers, particularly when these actors will have to exercise dis-
cretion and serve vulnerable groups.164 This aspect is particularly important in 
159 Also in the enforcement of student allowances the parliament was informed about the 
private investigations and risk-profiling, see parliamentary papers 2010/11, 32 770.
160 Reisman and others (n 126).
161 D. McCabe. ‘Lawmakers Are Trying to Understand How Tech Giants’ Algorithms Work’. 
Axios 2017, November 29. Retrieved 1 August 2019, https://www.axios.com/lawmakers-
are-trying-to-understand-how-tech-giants-algorithms-work-1513307255-b4109efc-
9566-4e69-8922-f37d9e829f1f.html.
162 F. W. Bleichrodt, Over burgers en opsporing [On Citizens and Crime Detection] (2000) 
p. 16 [in Dutch].
163 See, for instance, Davidson (n 111); J. D. Michaels (n 53).
164 J. Freeman, ‘Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization’, Harvard Law Review 
116(5) (2003) 1285–1352 at 1345.
Downloaded from Brill.com07/30/2020 12:12:48PM
via free access
 37Outsourcing the Welfare State
<UN>
european journal of comparative law and governance 7 (2020) 5-42
the context of profiling. Although at the time of writing there is limited case 
law about profiling in general, Dutch courts have been critical as regards the 
use of ethnical profiling regardless of whether these profiles are developed by 
public and private actors and have declared various profiling practices uncon-
stitutional as they breach the principle of equality and the prohibition of 
non-discrimination.165
Enhanced accountability can also be achieved through clearer contractual 
terms and ensuring that private investigators are bound by stricter legal con-
straints. Limiting the discretion of private actors gives the government greater 
influence and reduces potential ambiguities as well as the mismatch between 
private and public interests. In addition, as Nestor Davidson explains, clear 
contractual arrangements in social welfare also give “a clear metric for translat-
ing public goals into a discernable framework of delegation, as well as effective 
means to ensure that those goals are being met.”166
The general regulation of the involvement of private actors in the adminis-
tration of public tasks varies greatly between highly regulated systems in cer-
tain continental European countries (strict training hours, equipment) and 
minimal and experimental standards on voucher systems and eligibility con-
trol imposed by state or provincial regulations in the United States.167 Never-
theless, accountability for the involvement of private actors in welfare fraud 
investigations should mean that public authorities do not employ infor-
mants, private detectives, and automated systems without adequate supervi-
sion, instructions, and a clear framework. This brings us to the last mechanism 
of enhancing accountability: the extension of public law obligations (adminis-
trative law and human rights) to private actors in addition to contract and tort 
law.168 In the United Kingdom and the United States, there has been significant 
resistance towards the incorporation of general public law or human rights 
165 For example, the Dutch public body responsible for a number of tasks within the Ministry 
of Education (duo) including student loans and student house allowances, has created 
risk profiles (e.g. the distance between the parents’ address and the registered address. 
Various other social welfare institutions profiled on the base of property (especially in 
Turkey, because of the sound registration of housing property), on ethnicity, country of 
origin or descent (especially Morocco), or age (especially citizens older than 55 due to 
their limited employability). See, for example, Centrale Raad voor Beroep (CRvB) 14 April 
2015, ecli:NL:crvb:2015:1228; CRvB 8 September 2015, ecli:NL:crvb:2015:3249; CRvB 21 
November 2017, ecli:NL:crvb:2017:4068. Ethnical profiling has been allowed in CRvB 1 
October 2018, ecli:NL:crvb:2018:2912.
166 Davidson (n 111) 277.
167 H. Freedman, M.R. Mannix, M. Cohan, and R. Scharf, ‘Uncharted Terrain: The Intersection 
of Privatization and Welfare’, Clearinghouse Review 35(9/10) (2002) 557–572.
168 Donnelly (n 9) 350.
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obligations in contracts.169 Instead, it is up to public bodies to draft contractual 
specifications that ensure adequate monitoring of contractors. Contrary to 
Dutch cases analyzed earlier in this article, U.K. and U.S. Courts have also prov-
en to be reluctant to extend public law to private contractors.170
4.3 Proportionate Enforcement
Welfare fraud investigations involving intrusive surveillance conducted by 
public or private actors are required to be in conformity with clear and specific 
rules as well as with the principle of proportionality.171 As explained earlier, 
surveillance is in “accordance with the law” when investigation powers have 
“some basis in domestic law (as opposed to a practice which does not have a 
specific legal basis).”172 Compliance with the principle of proportionality re-
quires a more complex assessment. This was underlined in the ECtHR deci-
sion Big Brother and others v. the United Kingdom which held that the ability to 
order disproportionate forms of mass surveillance on citizens was a violation 
of the rights to privacy and freedom of expression.173 Public institutions are 
often confronted with the accusation that it is not proportionate to employ 
surveillance technologies that gather huge amounts of data but that only de-
liver a small number of successful cases.174 This is true not only in the case of 
surveillance for the protection of national security but also in the context of 
welfare investigations (for example, in the pending Dutch case of SyRi).
The aim behind welfare investigations is clearly a legitimate one: to se-
cure the sustainability of the welfare system. Nevertheless, the methods used 
to enforce welfare conditionality must not exceed the necessary and adequate 
minimum that is required to detect fraud.175 Considering that outsourcing en-
forcement tasks to private actors exacerbates the risk of violation of funda-
mental rights, public institutions should make a double proportionality assess-
ment: first, is it necessary and adequate to outsource welfare investigations to 
169 Ibid 381.
170 See the leading case, YL v. Birmingham City Council, [2007] ewca Civ 26, (2008) Q.B. 1. 
For a thorough analysis of this issue see Donnelly (n 9).
171 J. Milaj, ‘Privacy, surveillance, and the proportionality principle: The need for a method of 
assessing privacy implications of technologies used for surveillance,’ International Review 
of Law, Computers & Technology 30(6) (2016) 115–130.
172 Heglas v. the Czech Republic no. 5935/02, § 74, 1 March 2007.
173 Big Brother Watch and others v. United Kingdom (Applications nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 
and 24960/15) [2018] echr 722, § 352–388.
174 M. Crayford and W. Pieters, ‘The Effectiveness of Surveillance Technology: What Intelli-
gence Officers Are Saying’, The Information Society 34(2) (2018) 88–103.
175 See generally on this topic B. Watts and S. Fitzpatrick, Welfare Conditionality (London: 
Routledge, 2018).
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private actors and what are the risks of doing so? Second, the need to use ad-
ditional and undercover means to gather evidence should be balanced against 
the right to privacy of welfare recipients.176 This right should be here under-
stood as comprehending the right not to be subject to intrusive investigations 
for small mistakes (e.g., failure to disclose limited additional income) and not 
to reuse data that was not collected with the original purpose of surveillance.177 
For example, Section 1 (2) of the Social Security Fraud Act 2001 (United King-
dom) provides that an authorized officer can request information from private 
and public sector organizations regarding individuals, provided there are “rea-
sonable grounds” for believing that the claimant or a family member is com-
mitting or intends to commit an offence. Although this disposition is comple-
mented by a statutory code of practice, this piece of legislation has raised 
questions regarding the data protection of welfare recipients.178 The broad 
powers given to officials are justified by the potential losses of public funds and 
the idea that welfare recipients can be expected to be subject to intrusive, de-
tailed and ongoing surveillance in exchange for the benefits they receive.179 
Nevertheless, this should not entail that welfare recipients should be subject to 
detailed background checks or followed by private detectives.180
A proportionate use of automated systems also includes a reasonable as-
sessment of the data that needs to be collected in order to establish fraud. 
There is an inherent tension between the desire for big data to optimize the 
quality of the risk assessment and the legal rules on data protection that ask for 
data-minimization.181 Especially in the field of social welfare, this tension is 
eminent, as personal data is the raw material of the benefits system. Recently, 
the major of Rotterdam refused to use the data-matching and risk-profiling 
system SyRI because of the disproportionate data-handling.182 Less intrusive 
176 See M. Button and J. Gee, Countering Fraud for Competitive Advantage: The Professional 
Approach to Reducing the Last Great Hidden Costs (Hoboken: Wiley, 2013).
177 See J. Milaj, ‘Invalidation of the Data Retention Directive: Extending the Proportionality 
Test’, Computer Law and Security 31(5) (2015) 604–617.
178 McKeever (n 21) 141, 150–151.
179 Ibid, at 150–151.
180 J. Milaj, ‘Privacy, surveillance, and the proportionality principle: The need for a method of 
assessing privacy implications of technologies used for surveillance’, International Review 
of Law, Computers & Technology 30(6) (2016) 115–130.
181 See gdpr (General Data Protection Regulation), recital 39: ‘In particular, the specific pur-
poses for which personal data are processed should be explicit and legitimate and deter-
mined at the time of the collection of the personal data. The personal data should be 
 adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which they are 
processed’.
182 See, for a critical analysis of this system, Gantchev (n 2).
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systems developed by private companies (e.g., Totta Data Lab) to predict fraud 
continue to be used by other Dutch municipalities. Even though these systems 
do not make decisions, it is important to underline that whenever risk-profil-
ing is in hands of private tech companies, it becomes extremely hard to assess 
the proportionality of data collection and the potential reuse of data for com-
mercial purposes as private companies will not allow the public to scrutinize 
their operations.183
Finally, a proportionate use of private actors and their technologies is also 
important to reduce the longstanding stigmatization of welfare recipients. The 
widespread use of private automated systems and contracts with private ac-
tors is susceptible of promoting a tip-off culture and thus raise not only legal 
but also ethical questions.184 As Virginia Eubanks explains in Automating In-
equality, digital tools created to manage poverty, including data mining and 
automated decision-making, are based on moralistic ideas on poverty that cre-
ate a high-tech system of policing and containment.185 These ideas include the 
perception that welfare recipients are not entitled to the same degree of pri-
vacy and data protection as other taxpayers as they depend on public assis-
tance. This perception is fundamentally incompatible with the principle of 
effective exercise of the right to social security or social assistance.186
5 Conclusion
In the Atlantic Charter of 1941, social security was defined by its original aim: 
“the freedom from fear and want.”187 Nowadays, this statement could not be 
further away from the reality observed in modern welfare states. This article 
shows that welfare recipients in different countries have been subject to close 
private surveillance and that the aim to prevent and sanction welfare fraud has 
spoken louder than the procedural guarantees and fundamental rights of these 
individuals. Privatization of public functions is to blame. As Julie Cohen has 
pointed out “over the last decades (…) surveillance has become increasingly 
183 See, for an analysis of the potential and legal limits of data reuse, B. Custers and H. Ursic, 
‘Big Data and Data Reuse: A Taxonomy of Data Reuse for Balancing Big Data Benefits and 
Personal Data Protection’, Internationl Data Privacy Law 6(1) (2016) 4–15.
184 Estrin Gilman (n 147).
185 V. Eubanks (n 14) 16.
186 Gantchev (n 2) 19.
187 M. Westerveld, ‘Women and social security’, in: F. Pennings and G. Vonk (eds), Research 
Handbook on European Social Security Law (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, Mass: 
Edward Elgar, 2015) 257–280 at 259.
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privatized, commercialized (…) and it has become participatory.”188 Neverthe-
less, the outsourcing of powers to private actors should not mean that these 
powers are expanded beyond what public actors were allowed to do or that 
accountability and proportionality assessments are bypassed. As Catherine 
Donnelly explains: “Given that the power does not change when transferred 
from public to private, it is difficult to understand why the controls on the pow-
er should be different: control should depend on the nature of the power—not 
on the identity of the power-holder.”189
The involvement of private actors and the use of automated systems devel-
oped by private technology companies illustrate new dimensions of the grow-
ing privatization movement: on the one hand, governments seek to optimize 
their systems, become closer to the citizenry, offer a fair allocation of services, 
and stimulate citizens to participate and contribute with their knowledge. On 
the other, by relying on informants, private detectives and digital technology, 
governments are stigmatizing welfare recipients. In this context, public au-
thorities delegate directly or indirectly the tasks of predicting and detecting 
fraud to private actors not only to save public money but also to expand their 
access to information about welfare recipients.
The examples analyzed in this article contribute to the international litera-
ture by showing the risks of expanding the outsourcing of public tasks to the 
private sector under indeterminate legislative and contractual conditions, lim-
ited public supervision, and reduced transparency of automated systems. The 
outsourcing of welfare fraud investigations to private actors with almost un-
constrained investigation instruments risks converting public law enforce-
ment into a system where poverty is almost criminalized. We contend that 
from an expertise point of view, social welfare fraud detection may not easily 
justify the unlimited outsourcing of public law enforcement to private ac-
tors  with the risks thereof. The same applies to the employment of private 
 actors to investigate welfare fraud and create risk profiles using big data and 
predictive analytics. The outsourcing of these tasks to private companies raise 
constitutional concerns which include the violation of the right to respect for 
private life, equal treatment (e.g., due to the risk of discrimination resulting 
from profiling), and the right to a fair trial. Drawing on the case law discussed 
in this Article, we argue that public law and its procedural guarantees should 
188 J. Cohen, ‘The Surveillance-Innovation Complex: The Irony of the Participatory Turn’, in: 
D. Barney et al (eds), The Participatory Condition in the Digital Age (Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 2016) 207–226.
189 Donnelly (n 9) 351.
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be applied to welfare fraud investigations, regardless of who is conducting the 
investigation, as long as public and private actors are working together.
This article does not aim to argue against the outsourcing of public tasks to 
private investigators as such an idea would be unrealistic given the benefits 
offered by private detectives.190 Rather, this article offers considerations that 
could help national legislators reflect upon the proportionality of outsourcing 
decisions and the need to design adequate legal and contractual framework for 
the privatization of public enforcement in areas of social policy. This frame-
work should take into account a number of aspects such as when, how, and 
under what circumstances anti-fraud prevention and detection tasks may be 
automated and outsourced to private agents.
Many of the objections raised to automated systems developed and used by 
private companies and detectives would also be valid against public bodies. 
Nevertheless, the reliance on private actors and technology further enhances 
the opacity of the decision-making process, the incentive to draw inferences 
from historical data and biases to find fraud, and set aside the public interest 
and safeguard of fundamental rights.
In addition, as Matthew Stephenson points out, it is important to also ask 
“which organs of government ought to be involved in the creation and defini-
tion of private enforcement rights.”191 Finally, “social welfare spies”— regardless 
of whether they are public or private actors—should not subject welfare re-
cipients to a dehumanized state of permanent surveillance where tipping-off 
neighbors is encouraged and where welfare recipients’ privacy is worth less 
than that of other citizens. Rather, new forms of privatization should still be 
proportionate, legitimate, and imbued with public values. Automated systems 
used in this context should be trained to limit negative human rights impacts 
(e.g., discrimination), offer meaningful transparency measures, and allow citi-
zens to rely on public assistance without losing the right to a private life.192
190 Button (n 28).
191 M.C. Stephenson, ‘Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the 
Role of Administrative Agencies’, Virginia Law Review 91(1) (2005) 93–173 at 106.
192 D. K. Mulligan and K. A. Bamberger, ‘Saving Governance by Design’, California Law Review 
106(3) (2018) 697–784.
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